The NZ government’s plan to withhold COVID inquiry findings until 2026 leaves the country ill-prepared for the next pandemic
The first report from a Royal Commission of Inquiry to review New Zealand’s response to the COVID pandemic was due to be released this month.
But the coalition government plans to withhold it, potentially until a second phase of the inquiry (with a new set of questions and commissioners) can be completed in 2026.
Many countries have undertaken similar inquiries, for similar reasons, and some of these are starting to report back. Australia, our nearest neighbour and the country that shared a pandemic response most like ours, has recently released the findings from its inquiry.
New Zealand and Australia had among the lowest rates of fatalities from COVID in the world. Neither country followed its preexisting pandemic plan, instead developing strategies that prevented widespread transmission of the virus until vaccines became available.
The Australian inquiry has a similar wide ranging scope to ours. Its report addresses some issues New Zealand didn’t face, such as the inconsistency across the state and federal response. But until ours is released, it may be New Zealand’s best guide for preparing for the next pandemic.
There are also opportunities for us to partner with Australia to build capacity.
What the Australian report found
A central finding of the Australian inquiry is that minimising harm should be a guiding principle in a pandemic. That means minimising harm from the disease itself as well as indirect harms, such as disruption to healthcare or harms resulting from the measures used to control the pandemic.
The report suggests that, while unprecedented measures like lockdowns were justified at the start of the pandemic when uncertainty was high, the state and federal governments could have struck a better balance between direct and indirect harms as the pandemic progressed, particularly once vaccines became available.
The inquiry also found the social licence for disruptive measures such as school and business closures is fragile. If interventions like these are to be used in future, they need to be carefully justified through consideration of wider impacts and harms.
There also needs to be a clear plan for lifting them so people can be confident they will not cost more than absolutely necessary.
However, the underlying theme of the Australian report is that the only way to reduce the impact of a future pandemic is to invest in health, planning and infrastructure now.
That means concerted action to reduce health inequities, expand healthcare and scientific capacity. “Building the plane while flying it” is unlikely to deliver the best outcomes.
The report identifies many measures that need to be urgently advanced in the next 12 to 18 months. This includes the establishment of an Australian Centre for Disease Control, an initiative already underway.
Implications for New Zealand
It is possible New Zealand will not even publish its report in the next 12 to 18 months. Yet many of the issues identified in Australia are likely to be just as urgent here. We can’t afford to wait.
A 2023 report on preparing for future pandemics, released by the infectious diseases research platform Te Niwha, identified a number of core capabilities essential for a successful response. These include building scientific and healthcare capacity in specific areas such as surveillance, testing laboratories and vaccines.
These are all areas where New Zealand would benefit immensely from closer collaboration with its wealthier and better resourced neighbour. If we wait until 2026, we will miss a crucial window to co-invest in these capabilities with Australia as it prepares.
The Te Niwha report also identifies a number of broader systemic issues that need to be addressed. These include fixing long-standing health inequities, giving effect to tino rangatiratanga (Māori self-determination) and building trust in public health. Tackling these will have many other benefits but it will require a sustained effort, starting now.
The next pandemic
The next pandemic is a question of when not if. The disruption of natural habitat by climate change and the ongoing encroachment by human society mean the risk of another pandemic is increasing.
The number of pathogens that could trigger the next pandemic is also growing, according to an updated list published by the World Health Organization earlier this year.
In the United States, the H5N1 bird flu virus has repeatedly spilled over from cattle to dairy workers. So far, this hasn’t triggered an outbreak in the human population. But it is concerning the virus is being given plenty of opportunities to evolve the ability to spread from person to person.
This looks like a pandemic-in-waiting, but the next one could be caused by something else altogether. We simply can’t predict the type of pathogen that might cause it or precisely when it will strike. But it is coming, and we can’t let our guard down.
As the Australian report says, “the unimaginable can quickly become necessary” in a pandemic.
This article is republished from The Conversation. It was written by: Shaun Hendy, Te Herenga Waka — Victoria University of Wellington and Michael Plank, University of Canterbury
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Shaun Hendy received funding from the Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment and the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet for mathematical modelling of Covid-19 during the pandemic while at Waipapa Taumata Rau-the University of Auckland. He now works at Toha, a privately-owned company, but is an adjunct professor at Te Herenga Waka - Victoria University of Wellington.
Michael Plank received funding from the Ministry of Health for mathematical modelling of Covid-19 during the pandemic. He also receives funding from Te Niwha and was a co-author of the 2023 report on Likely Future Pandemic Agents and Scenarios.